Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.
• The existence of a Nash equilibrium in potential games is guaranteed in many practical situations [126] (Theorems 1 and 2 in this paper), but is not guaranteed for general strategic form games. Other classes of games possessing Nash equilibria are summarized in [92, §2.2] and [68, §3.4 ].
• Unilateral improvement dynamics in potential games with finite strategy sets are guaranteed to converge to the Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps, i.e., they do not cycle [126] (Theorem 4 in this paper). As a result, learning algorithms can be systematically designed.
A game that does not have these properties is discussed in Example 2 in Section II.
We provide an overview of problems in wireless networks that can be formulated in terms of potential games. We also clarify the relations among games, and provide simpler proofs of some known results. Problem-specific learning algorithms [92] , [168] are beyond the scope of this paper.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Sections II, III, and IV, we introduce strategic form games, potential games, and learning algorithms, respectively. We then discuss various potential games in Sections V to XVIII, as shown in Table I . Finally, we provide a few concluding remarks in Section XIX. The notation used here is shown in Table II . Unless the context indicates otherwise, sets of strategies are denoted by calligraphic uppercase letters, e.g., A i , strategies are denoted by lowercase letters, e.g., a i ∈ A i , and tuples of strategies are denoted by boldface lowercase letters, e.g., a. Note that a i is a scalar variable when A i is a set of scalars or indices, a i is a vector variable when A i is a set of vectors, and a i is a set variable when A i is a collection of sets.
We use R to denote the set of real numbers, R + to denote the set of nonnegative real numbers, R ++ to denote the set of positive real numbers, and C to denote the set of complex numbers. The cardinality of set A is denoted by |A|. The power set of A is denoted by 2
A . Finally, ½condition is the indicator function, which is one when condition is true and is zero otherwise.
We treat many system models, as shown in Fig. 1 . In multiple-access channels, as shown in 
A "canonical network model" [15] , shown in Fig. 1(d) , consists of clusters that are spatially separated in order for G ij = G ji to hold. Note that these network models have been discussed in terms of graph structure in [143] . June 
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We use ji to denote a directed link from TX i to TX j or cluster i to cluster j. Let interference graph (I, E) be an undirected graph, where the set of vertices I = {1, 2, . . . } corresponds to TXs or clusters, and i interferes with j if ji ∈ E, as shown in Fig. 1 (e), i.e., E := { ji | G ji P > T } where P is the transmission power level for every TX and T is a threshold of the received power. Note that in undirected graph (I, E), ji ∈ E ⇔ ij ∈ E, for every {i, j} ⊂ I. We denote the neighborhood of i in graph (I, E) by I i := { j ∈ I \ {i} | ji ∈ E }. We also define
II. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
We begin with the definition of a strategic form game and present an example of a gametheoretic formulation of a simple channel selection problem. Moreover, we discuss other useful concepts, such as the best response and Nash equilibrium. The analysis of Nash equilibria in the channel selection example reveals the potential presence of cycles in best-response adjustments.
Definition 1:
A strategic (or normal) form game is a triplet G := (I, (A i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I ), or simply
, where I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|} is a finite set of players (decision makers) 1 , A i is the set of strategies (or actions) for player i ∈ I, and u i : i∈I A i → R is the payoff (or utility) function of player i ∈ I that must be maximized.
If S ⊆ I, we denote the Cartesian product i∈S A i by A S . If S = I, we simply write A to denote A I , and i to denote i∈I . When S = I \ {i}, we let A −i denote A I\{i} , and j =i
. . , a |I| ) ∈ A, and
Example 1:
Consider a channel selection problem in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) . Each TX-RX pair is assumed to select its channel in a decentralized manner in order to minimize the received interference power.
The channel selection problem can be formulated as a strategic form game G1 := (I, (C i ), (u1 i )).
The elements of the game are as follows: the set of players I is the set of TX-RX pairs. The strategy set for each pair i, C i is the set of available channels. The received interference power x Mixed strategy profile, x ∈ i ∆(Ai)
Gi
Link gain between TX i and a single isolated RX in Fig. 1 (a)
Gij
Link gain between TX j and RX i; Gji = Gij in Fig. 1(b) , and Gji = Gij in Figs. 1(c) and at RX i ∈ I is determined by a combination of channels c = (c i ) i∈I ∈ C = i C i , where
Set of edges in undirected graph
June 29, 2015 DRAFT Let −I i (c) be the payoff function to be maximized, i.e.,
Note that G1 was introduced in [140] , and we further discuss it in Example 2.
Definition 2:
The best-response correspondence 2 (or simply, best response) BR i :
of player i to strategy profile a −i is the correspondence
or equivalently,
A fundamental solution concept for strategic form games is the Nash equilibrium:
Definition 3: A strategy profile a * = (a * i , a * −i ) ∈ A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (or simply a Nash equilibrium) of game (I, (
for every i ∈ I and a i ∈ A i ; equivalently, a in Fig. 2(a) , BR 2 (c −2 ) = {2}, i.e., pair 2 has an incentive to change its channel a 2 from 1 to 2, and (4) does not hold. Because of the symmetry property of the arrangement in Fig. 2 , every strategy profile does not satisfy (4) . Furthermore, the best-response channel adjustments, which will be formally discussed in Section IV, cycle as (1, 1, 2), (1, 2, 2), (1, 2, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 1), (2, 1, 2) , and (1, 1, 2), as shown in Figs. 2(a-f) .
The channel allocation game G1 is discussed further in Section V.
III. POTENTIAL GAMES
We state key definitions and properties of potential games in Section III-A, show how to identify and design exact potential games in Sections III-B and III-C, and show how to identify ordinal potential games in Section III-D.
A. Definitions and Properties of Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley [126] introduced the following classes of potential games 4 :
exists an exact potential function φ : A → R such that
for every i ∈ I, a i , a 
for every i ∈ I, a i , a ′ i ∈ A i , and a −i ∈ A −i , where sgn(·) denotes the sign function. Although the potential function φ is independent of the indices of the players, φ reflects any unilateral change in any payoff function u i for every player i.
Since an EPG is a WPG and a WPG is an OPG [126] , [177] , the following properties of OPGs are satisfied by EPGs and WPGs. 4 There are a variety of generalized concepts of potential games, e.g., generalized ordinal potential games [126] , best-response potential games [177] , pseudo-potential games [56] , near-potential games [28] , [29] , and state-based potential games [114] .
Applications of these games are beyond the scope of this paper. [154] .
The most important property of potential games is acyclicity, which is also referred to as the finite improvement property.
Definition 7 (Finite improvement property [126] ): A path in (I, (A i ), (u i )) is a sequence
. .) such that for every integer k ≥ 1, there exists a unique player i such that 
B. Identification of Exact Potential Games
The definition of an EPG utilizes a potential function (5 
for every i, j ∈ I [126, Theorem 4.5].
Theorem 6: Let (I, (A i ), (u i,1 )) and (I, (A i ), (u i,2 )) be EPGs with potential functions φ 1 (a)
and φ 2 (a), respectively. Furthermore, let α, β ∈ R. Then, (I, (A i ), (αu i,1 + βu i,2 )) is an EPG with potential function αφ 1 (a) + βφ 2 (a) [59] .
1) Coordination-dummy Games:
If u i (a) = u(a) for all i ∈ I, where u : A → R, the game
is called a coordination game 5 or an identical interest game, and u is called a coordination function [59] .
is called a dummy game, and d i is called a dummy function [59] .
If u i (a) = s i (a i ) for all i ∈ I, where s i :
self-motivated game, and s i is called a self-motivated function [133] .
is an EPG if and only if there exist functions u : A → R and
for every i ∈ I [59] , [163] . This game is said to be a coordination-dummy game. The potential function of this game is φ(a) = u(a).
Example 3: From Theorem 7, any identical interest game is an EPG. Almost all games found
in studies applying identical interest games [19] , [27] , [55] , [74] , [107] , [142] , [165] have the form of game G2 := (I, (A i ), (u2 i )), where
for every i ∈ I and f j (a) is a performance indicator of player j, e.g., f j (a) is the individual throughput and u2 i (a) is the aggregated throughput of all players [165] . Note that in most of these works, G2 is used for comparison with other games.
Example 4:
Closely related to G2, the form of game G3 with payoff
where f i : A i × A I i → R, is found in many scenarios: data stream control in multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) [14] , channel assignment [188] , joint power, channel and BS assignment [162] , joint power and user scheduling [206] , BS selection [54] , and BS sleeping [208] . Note that G3 is not an identical interest game, but can be seen as G2 on graphs, where the performance indicator of player i is a function of strategies of its neighbors, i.e., f i : A i × A I i → R, and the sum of the performance indicators of player i and neighbors I i is set for the payoff function of player i. It can be easily proved that G3 is an EPG with potential
2) Bilateral Symmetric Interaction Games: A strategic form game G4 :
where
.
Theorem 8 ( [174]):
A BSI game G4 is an EPG with potential function
Example 5: Consider a quasi-Cournot game G5 := (I, (A i ), (u5 i )) with a linear inverse demand function, where each player i ∈ I produces a homogeneous product and determines the output. Let A i = R ++ be a set of possible outputs. The payoff function of player i is defined
where α, β > 0 and cost i : A i → R is a differentiable cost function. Since
G5 is an EPG with potential
[163]. Further discussion can be found in [126] , [174] . 
for every a ∈ A and i ∈ I. The potential function is
4) Congestion Games:
In congestion games (CGs), the payoff for using a resource (e.g., a channel or a facility) is a function of the number of players using the same resource. More precisely, CGs are defined as follows:
In the congestion model proposed by Rosenthal [149] , each player i uses a subset a i of common resources F , and receives resource-specific payoff w f (|I f (a)|) from resource f ∈ a i according to the number of players using resource f . Here,
represents the set of players that use resource f . Then, |I
A strategic form game G7 := (I, (A i ), (u7 i )) associated with a congestion model, where
is called a CG. Note that A i is a collection of subsets of F and is not a set. Moreover, a i ∈ A i is a set, not a scalar quantity. Note that a CG where the strategy of every player is a singleton,
Theorem 10: A CG G7 is an EPG with potential function Note that generalized CGs do not necessarily possess potential functions. For generalized CGs with potential, we refer the interested reader to [1] , [120] . It was proved that CGs with playerspecific payoff functions [125] , and those with resource-specific payoff functions and playerspecific constants [120] , have potential. CGs with linear payoff function on undirected/directed graphs has been discussed in [20] .
C. Design of Payoff Functions
In some scenarios, we can design payoff functions and assign them to players to ensure that the game is an EPG. Such approach is often applied in the context of cooperative control [115] .
These design methodologies can be used when we want to derive payoff functions from a given global objective so that the game with the designed payoff functions is an EPG with the global objective as the potential function. If the global objective is in the form of (19), we can derive payoff functions by using (18) .
Otherwise, we can utilize many design rules: the equally shared rule, marginal contribution, and the Shapley values [159] , [174] . Since Marden and Wierman [118] have already summarized these rules, we only present marginal contribution here.
Marginal contribution, or the wonderful life utility (WLU) [182] , is the following payoff function derived from the potential function:
where φ(a −i ) is the value of the potential function in the absence of player i. The game with the WLU is an EPG with potential function φ [118] .
When the potential function for each player is represented as the sum of functions f i : A → R,
i.e., φ(a) = j f j (a) and φ(a −i ) = j =i f j (a −i ), the WLU (22) can be written as
where f j (a −i ) − f j (a) represents the loss to player j resulting from player i's participation.
Example 6 (Consensus game):
In the consensus problem [173] , each player i adjusts a i and tries to reach
Marden et al. [115] considered the global objective
and proposed using the WLU
Since game G8 := (I, (A i ), (u8 i )) is a BSI game with w ij (a i , a j ) = − a i − a j ½ij∈E, G8 is confirmed to be an EPG.
D. Identification of Ordinal Potential Games
In contrast to EPGs, OPGs have many ordinal potential functions [126] .
Theorem 11: Consider the game (I, (A i ), (u i )). If there exists a strictly increasing transformation f i : R → R for every i ∈ I such that game (I, (A i ), (f i (u i ))) is an OPG, the original game (I, (A i ), (u i )) is an OPG with the same potential function [133] .
IV. LEARNING ALGORITHMS
A variety of learning algorithms are available to facilitate the convergence of potential games to Nash equilibrium, e.g., myopic best response, fictitious play, reinforcement learning, and spatial adaptive play. Unfortunately, there are no general dynamics that are guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium for a wide class of games [71] . 
The other players choose the same strategy, i.e.,
Note that while the term "best-response dynamics" was introduced by Matsui [119] , it has many representations depending on the type of game. We also note that best-response dynamics may converge to sub-optimal Nash equilibria. By contrast, the following spatial adaptive play can converge to the optimal Nash equilibrium. To be precise, it maximizes the potential function with arbitrarily high probability.
Definition 9:
Consider a game with a finite number of strategy sets. Log-linear learning [22] , spatial adaptive play [198] , and logit-response dynamics [5] refer to the following update rule: At each step k, a player i ∈ I unilaterally changes his/her strategy from a i [k] to a i with probability
where β (0 < β < ∞) is related to the (inverse) temperature in an analogy to statistical physics.
Note that in the limit β → ∞, the spatial adaptive play approaches the best-response dynamics.
Note that (27) is the solution to the following approximated maximization problem:
which is called a perturbed payoff, where a i ∈A i x i (a i ) log x i (a i ) is the entropy function. The derivation of (27) from (28) can be found in [37] .
Theorem 12 ( [22] , [198] ): In the finite EPG (I, (A i ), (u i )) with potential function φ, the spatial adaptive play has the unique stationary distribution of strategy profile x ∈ ∆(A), where
i.e., it is also the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution.
Further discussion can be found in [15] , [117] .
V. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE RECEIVED AND GENERATED INTERFERENCE POWER IN TX-RX PAIR MODEL
In the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) , Nie and Comaniciu [140] pointed out that the channel selection game G1 introduced in Section II was not an EPG. Note that the payoff function of G1 is the negated sum of received interference from neighboring TXs. To ensure that the channel selection game is an EPG, they considered the channel selection game G9, whose payoff function was the negated sum of the received interference from neighboring TXs, and generated interference to neighboring RXs, i.e.,
Since G9 is a BSI game with w ij (c i , c j ) = −(G ij P j + G ji P i ) ½c j =c i , it is an EPG with potential
which corresponds to the negated sum of received interference in the entire network. Note that in order to evaluate (30) , each pair i needs to estimate or share the values of the generated interference to neighboring RXs, G ji P i ½c j =c i .
Concurrently with the above, Kauffmann et al. [82] discussed the following potential function φ10(c), which includes RX-specific noise power N i (c i ), and derived a payoff function using Theorem 9,
To enable multi-channel allocation, e.g., orthogonal frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) subcarrier allocation or resource block allocation, La et al. [88] discussed a modification of G9 suitable for multi-channel allocation.
In contrast to unidirectional links assumed in the TX-RX pair model, Uykan and Jäntti [175] , [176] discussed a channel assignment problem for bidirectional links and proposed a joint transmission order and channel assignment algorithm.
A. Joint Transmission Power and Channel Allocation
Nie et al. [141] showed that the joint channel selection and power control game with payoff
is an EPG. Because the best response in G11 results in the minimum transmission power level, Bloem et al. [21] proposed adding terms α log(1 + G ii p i ) + β/p i to (34) to account for the achievable data rate and consumed power. Note that these terms are self-motivated functions, and the game with the modified payoff function is still an EPG.
As another type of joint assignment, a preliminary beamform pattern setting followed by channel allocation was discussed in [203] .
B. Primary-secondary Scenario and Heterogeneous Networks
To manage interference in primary-secondary systems, Bloem et al. [21] proposed adding terms related to the received and generated interferences from and to the primary user. They also proposed adding cost terms related to payoff function (34) . In particular, they discussed a Stackelberg game [131] , where the primary user was the leader and the secondary users were DRAFT June 29, 2015 followers. Giupponi and Ibars discussed overlay cognitive networks [66] and heterogeneous OFDMA networks [67] . Mustika et al. [129] took a similar approach to prioritize users.
Uplinks of heterogeneous OFDMA cellular systems with femtocells were discussed in [130] , whereas downlinks of OFDMA cellular systems, where each BS transmits to several mobile stations, were discussed in [89] , [90] . OFDMA relay networks were considered in [96] . Further discussion can be found in [76] . Joint BS/AP selection and channel selection problems were discussed in [48] .
VI. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE SINR AND THROUGHPUT IN TX-RX PAIR

MODEL
In the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) , the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at RX i is given by
Menon et al. [122] pointed out that there may be no Nash equilibrium in the channel selection
Instead, they proposed using the sum of the inverse SINR, defined by
as the payoff function. Similar to G9, G12 := (I, (C i ), (u12 i )) is a BSI game with w ij (c i ,
i.e., the sum of the inverse SINR in the network.
Note that the above expression is a single carrier version of orthogonal channel selection.
Menon et al. [122] discussed a waveform adaptation version of G12 that can be applied to codeword selection in non-orthogonal code division multiple access (CDMA), and Buzzi et al. [24] further discussed waveform adaptation. Buzzi et al. [23] also discussed an OFDMA subcarrier allocation version of G12. Cai et al. [25] discussed joint transmission power and channel assignment utilizing the payoff function (36) of G12.
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Gállego et al. [63] proposed using the network throughput of joint power and channel assignment,
as potential, where B c i is the bandwidth of channel c i , and Γ is the required SINR. It may have been difficult to derive a simple payoff function, and they thus proposed the WLU (23) of (38) .
VII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE THE NUMBER OF INTERFERENCE SIGNALS IN TX-RX PAIR MODEL
Yu et al. [199] and Chen et al. [36] considered sensor networks where each RX (sink) receives messages from multiple TXs (sensors). They proved that a channel selection that minimizes the number of received and generated interference signals is an EPG, where the potential is the number of total interference signals. Note that the average number of retries is approximately proportional to the number of received interference signals when the probability that the messages are transmitted is very small, as in sensor networks.
A simpler and related form of (30) is detailed in the following discussion. To reduce the information exchange required to evaluate (30), Yamamoto et al. [195] proposed using the number of received and generated interference sources as the payoff function, where the received interference power is greater than a given threshold T , i.e.,
This model is sometimes referred to as a "binary" interference model [110] in comparison with a "physical" interference model. Because G13 := (I, (C i ), (u13 i )) is a BSI game with
is an EPG. When we consider a directed graph, where edges between TX j and RX i indicate G ij P j > T , we denote TX i's neighboring RXs by R i := { j ∈ I | j = i and ji ∈ E }, and RX i's neighboring TXs by T i := { j ∈ I | j = i and ij ∈ E }. Using these expressions, (39) can be rewritten to
VIII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE RECEIVED INTERFERENCE POWER IN TX NETWORK MODEL
A. Identical Transmission Power Levels
In Section V, channel allocation games in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) are discussed. Neel et al. [135] , [136] considered a different channel allocation game typically applied to channel allocation for APs in the wireless local area networks (WLANs) shown in Fig. 1(c) , where each TX i ∈ I selects a channel c i ∈ C i to minimize the interference from other TXs, i.e.,
where P is the common transmission power level for every TX. Note that G ij = G ji in this scenario, whereas G ij = G ji in the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) . Moreover, note that interference from stations other than the TXs is not taken into account in the payoff function.
In addition to the TX network model, channel selection can be applied to the canonical network model shown in Fig. 1(d) [15] .
Because G14 is a BSI game where w ij (c i , c j ) = −G ij P ½c i =c j , it is an EPG with potential
which corresponds to the aggregated interference power among TXs. Neel et al. pointed out that other symmetric interference functions, e.g., max{B − |c i − c j |, 0}/B, where B is the common bandwidth for every channel, can be used instead of ½c i =c j in (41).
Kauffmann et al. [82] discussed essentially the same problem. However, they considered player-specific noise, and derived (41) by substituting G ij = G ji and P i = P j = P into (33).
Compared with the payoff function (30), (41) can be evaluated with only local information available at each TX; however, the transmission power levels of all TXs need to be identical.
We further discuss this requirement in Section VIII-B.
Liu and Wu [105] reformulated the game represented by (41) as a CG by introducing virtual resources. Further discussion can be found in [93] .
B. Non-identical Transmission Power Levels
To avoid the requirement of identical transmission power levels in (41), Neel [134] proposed using the product of (constant) transmission power level P i and interference I i (c) as the payoff function, i.e.,
Because G15 is a BSI game with w ij = −P i G ij P j ½c j =c i , G15 is an EPG with
Note that this form of payoff functions was provided by Menon et al. [123] in the context of waveform adaptations. This game under frequency-selective channels was discussed by Wu et al. [184] .
The relationship between (43) and its exact potential function (44) implies that the game G16 with payoff function
is a WPG with potential function φ15(c) and α i = 1/P i in (6), i.e., the identical transmission power level required in (41) is not necessarily required for the game to have the FIP. This was made clear by Bahramian et al. [17] and Babadi et al. [15] .
As extensions, in [179] , the interference management game G17 on graph structures with the following payoff function was discussed:
[185], [210] proposed using the expected value of interference in order to manage fluctuating interference. Zheng [207] treated dynamical on-off according to traffic variations in G16.
IX. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE SINR AND CAPACITY IN TX NETWORK MODEL
Menon et al. [123] showed that a waveform adaptation game where the payoff function is the SINR or the mean-squared error at the RX is an OPG. Chen and Huang [40] showed that a DRAFT June 29, 2015 channel allocation game in the TX network model shown in Fig. 1(c) , or in the canonical network model shown in Fig. 1(d) , where the payoff function is the SINR or a Shannon capacity, is an OPG. Here, we provide a derivation in the form of channel allocation according to the derivation provided in [123] . A channel selection game G18 with payoff function
is an EPG with potential
Because P i is a constant in (47), by Theorem 11, G19 with payoff
is an OPG with potential φ18(c). As a result, once again using Theorem 11, G20 with payoff
is an OPG with potential φ18(c). Xu et al. [191] further discuss G20, where the active TX set can be stochastically changed.
A quite relevant discussion was conducted by Song et al. [165] . They discussed a joint transmission power and channel assignment game G21 to maximize throughput:
where R : R → R represents throughput depending on SINR. They pointed out that since each user would set the maximum transmission power at a Nash equilibrium, G21 is equivalent to the channel selection game G14. Further discussion on joint transmission power and channel assignment can be found in [109] .
X. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO MANAGE THE NUMBER OF INTERFERENCE SIGNALS IN INTERFERENCE GRAPH
For the interference graph (I, E) shown in Fig. 1(e) , Xu et al. [188] proposed using the number of neighbors that select the same channel as the payoff function, i.e.,
We would like to point out that (52) can be reformulated to
i.e., G22 is a BSI game with w ij (c i , c j ) = − ½c j =c i ½ij∈E. Thus G22 is an EPG. Note that this is a special case of singleton CGs on graphs discussed in Section XI-A.
As variations of G22, Xu et al. [193] discussed the impact of partially overlapped channels.
Yuan et al. [200] discussed the variable-bandwidth channel allocation problem. Zheng et al.
[209] took into account stochastic channel access according to the carrier sense multiple access (CSMA) protocol. Xu et al. [190] discussed a multi-channel version of G22.
Liu et al. [106] discussed a common control channel assignment problem for cognitive radios, and proposed using j =i ½c j =c i for the payoff function so that every player chooses the same channel. This game is similar to the consensus game G8.
XI. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE THROUGHPUT IN COLLISION CHANNELS
Channels can be viewed as common resources in the congestion model introduced in Section III-B4. In general, throughput when using a channel depends only on the number of stations that select the relevant channel. A CG formulation is thus frequently used for channel selection problems. Altman et al. [9] formulated a multi-channel selection game in a single collision domain as a CG. Based on a CG formulation, channel selections by secondary stations were discussed in [80] , [189] . A channel selection problem in multiple collision domains was discussed in [192] . Iellamo et al. [78] used numerically evaluated successful access probabilities depending on the number of stations in CSMA/CA as payoff functions.
Here, we discuss channel selection problems in interference graph (I, E), where each node i ∈ I attempts to adjust its channel c i to maximize its successful access probability or throughput.
A. Slotted ALOHA
Consider collision channels shared using slotted ALOHA. Each node i adjusts its channel to avoid simultaneous transmissions on the same channel because these result in collisions. In this case, when one node exclusively chooses a channel, the node can transmit without collisions.
DRAFT Thus, the following payoff function captures the benefit of nodes:
G23 is a singleton CG on graphs, and Thomas et al. [169] showed that G23 is an OPG 7 .
Consider that each node has a transmission probability X i (0 < X i < 1). Chen and Huang [41] proposed using the logarithm of successful access probability,
and proved that G24 is a WPG. Here, we provide a different proof. When we consider
G25 is a BSI game with w ij (c i , c j ) = − log(1 − X i ) log(1 − X j ) ½c j =c i ½ij∈E. Thus, G24 is a WPG and, by Theorem 11, G26 with payoff
is an OPG. Chen and Huang [42] further discussed G26 with player-specific constants and proved that the game is an OPG.
Before concluding this section, we would like to point out the relationship between G24 and CGs. When we assume an identical transmission probability X i = X for every i, we get
i.e., G24 is a CG on graphs.
B. Random Backoff
Let the backoff time of player i be denoted by λ i ∈ [1, λ max ], where λ max represents the backoff window size. The probability to acquire channel access is given by
G27 is a singleton CG, and thus is an EPG. Furthermore, G28 with
is also a singleton CG.
Chen and Huang [40] showed that G27 with player-specific constants is an OPG. They [42] further discussed G27 and G28 on graphs with player-specific constants, and proved that these are OPGs according to the proof provided in [120] . Xu et al. [194] further discussed the game under fading channels.
Chen and Huang [42] generalized G28 to G29, whose payoff function is a generalized through-
where w i (> 0) represents the channel-sharing weight for player i. Du et al. [53] further discussed this kind of game.
For the TX-RX pair model shown in Fig. 1(b) , Canales and Gállego [26] proposed using the following network throughput as a result of joint transmission power and channel assignment as potential:
where G ij = G ji , B c i is the bandwidth of channel c i , and T is the power threshold of interference.
Since (62) is too complex, it may be difficult to derive simple payoff functions. Thus, Canales and Gállego proposed using payoff functions of the form of a WLU (23) . Note that the evaluation of the WLU of (62) Consider a collision channel shared using slotted ALOHA. Each node i adjusts its transmission probability x i ∈ [0, 1] to maximize the following successful access probability (minus the cost):
This is a well-known payoff function. Further discussion can be found in [167] . Because (63) satisfies (8), G30 := (I, ([0, 1]), (u30 i )) is an EPG with potential
Candogan et al. [30] showed that G30 in stochastic channel model, where each player adjusts his/her transmission probability based on the channel state, is a WPG. Cohen et al. [45] discussed a multi-channel version of G30. They also discussed G30 on graphs [46] .
For this kind of transmission probability adjustment to satisfy x i < 1, the cost function
needs to be used [50] . Because this cost function is a coordination function, a game with this cost function is still an EPG.
XIII. TRANSMISSION POWER ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE THROUGHPUT IN MULTIPLE-ACCESS CHANNEL
Here, we discuss power control problems in multiple-access channels, as shown in Fig. 1(a) , where each TX attempts to adjust its transmission power level to maximize its throughput. For a summary of transmission power control, we refer to [43] . Note that Saraydar et al. [153] applied a game-theoretic approach to an uplink transmission power control problem in a CDMA system.
The relation between potential games and transmission power control to achieve target SINR or target throughput has been discussed in [133] .
Alpcan et al. [7] formulated uplink transmission power control in a single-cell CDMA as the game G31 := (I, (P i ), (u31 i )), where P i := { p i | 0 < P i,min ≤ p i ≤ P i,max }, P i,min is the minimum transmission power, and P i,max is the maximum transmission power. In this game, each TX i ∈ I adjusts its transmission power p i ∈ P i to maximize its data rate (throughput), which is assumed to be proportional to the Shannon capacity, minus the cost of transmission June 29, 2015 DRAFT power, i.e.,
where S (> 1) is the spreading gain and α i is a positive real number. The cost function −α i p i is used to avoid an inefficient Nash equilibrium, where all TXs choose the maximum transmission power. All TXs choose this power because BR(p −i ) is the maximum transmission power for every TX when the cost function is not used [7] , [153] .
Alpcan et al. [7] proved the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium in the game, and
Neel [137, §5.8.3.1] showed that this game is not an EPG because (8) does not hold. Note that Neel et al. [132] was the first to apply the potential game approach to this type of power control.
Instead of G31, Fattahi and Paganini [60] proposed setting S = 1 in G31, i.e.,
and a self-motivated function cost i (p i ), G32 := (I, (P i ), (u32 i )) is an EPG with potential
Because φ32(p) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave, by Theorem 3, there is a unique maximizer for the potential, and best-response dynamics converge to a unique Nash equilibrium, which is the maximizer of the potential on strategy space i P i . Kenan et al. [83] discussed G32 over time-varying channels.
Neel [137, §5.8.3 .1] approximated (65) by
and showed that G33 := (I, (P i ), (u33 i )) is an EPG with potential φ33(p) = i (log p i − cost i (p i )). Candogan et al. [31] applied G33 to multi-cell CDMA systems, and verified that the modified game is an EPG with a unique Nash equilibrium by applying Theorem 3. A more general form of payoff functions of SINR was discussed in [65] . DRAFT June 29, 2015
A. Multi-channel Systems
A transmission power control game G32 with multiple channels was discussed in [73] , [81] , [145] . Let the set of channels be denoted by C. Each TX i ∈ I transmits through a subset of C to maximize the aggregated capacity
by adjusting the transmission power vector (p i,1 , . . . , p i,|C| ). This game is an EPG with potential
Mertikopoulos et al. [124] further discussed the game under fading channels. Note that multi-channel transmission power assignment problems can be seen as joint transmission power and channel assignment problems introduced in Section IX because a zero transmission power level means that the relevant channel has not been assigned [144] .
Note that [145] also discussed BS selection, and further discussion can be found in [75] . The joint transmission power and bandwidth assignment problem for relay networks was discussed in [3] . Primary-secondary scenario [49] and heterogeneous network scenario [101] , [181] , [204] were also discussed.
B. Precoding
Closely related problems to the power control problems discussed above are found in precoding schemes for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multiple-access channels. The instantaneous mutual information of TX i, assuming that multiuser interference can be modeled as a Gaussian random variable, is expressed as (70) where ρ = 1/N, H i ∈ C Nr×Nt is the channel matrix, H H i is the Hermitian transpose of H i , Q i is a covariance matrix of input signal, M t is the number of antennas at every TX, and M r is the number of antennas at a single RX. Belmega et al. [18] discussed a game where an input covariance matrix Q i is adjusted. Concurrently, Zhong et al. [213] discussed a game where a precoding matrix is adjusted. Since Q i is calculated from a precoding matrix, these games are equivalent.
Since (70) is a coordination-dummy function, this game is an EPG with the system's achievable sum-rate as potential. This game was further discussed in [92, Section 8] . Energy efficiency [212] , primary-secondary scenario [214] , and relay selection [211] were also discussed. Joint precoding and AP selection in multi-carrier system was discussed in [111] .
XIV. TRANSMISSION POWER ASSIGNMENT MAINTAINING CONNECTIVITY (TOPOLOGY CONTROL)
The primary goal of topology control [152] is to adjust transmission power to maintain network connectivity while reducing energy consumption to extend network lifetime and/or reducing interference to enhance throughput.
Komali et al. [85] formulated the topology control problem in the TX network model shown in Fig. 1(c) as G34 := (I, (P i ), (u34 i )) with P i = [0, P i,max ] and
where α ≥ max i {P i,max }, and f i (p) is the number of TXs with whom TX i establishes (possibly over multiple hops) a communication path using bidirectional links. Note that f i (p
This game has been shown to be an OPG with
Note that the mathematical representation of f i (p) using connectivity matrix [201] was first proposed in [127] .
Komali et al. [84] also discussed interference reduction through channel assignment, which is seen as a combination of G14 and a channel assignment version of G34. They further discussed the impact of the amount of knowledge regarding the network on the spectral efficiency [86] .
Chu and Sethu [44] considered battery-operated stations and formulated transmission power control to prolong network lifetime while maintaining connectivity as an OPG. Similar approaches can be found in [69] , and the joint assignment of transmission power and channels was discussed in [70] .
Liu et al. [103] , [104] formulated measures for transmission power and sensing range adjustment to enhance energy efficiency while maintaining sensor coverage as an OPG.
XV. FLOW AND CONGESTION CONTROL IN THE FLUID NETWORK MODEL
Başar et al. [6] , [16] formulated a flow and congestion control game, where each user i adjusts the amount of traffic flow r i to enhance
where 1/(capacity − i r i ) represents the commodity-link cost of congestion. Because (73) is a combination of self-motivated and coordination functions, a game G35 with payoff function u35 i (r) is an EPG [10] , [171] with
The learning process of this game was further discussed by Scutari et al. [155] . Other payoff functions for flow control were discussed in [58] , [100] .
XVI. ARRIVAL RATE CONTROL FOR AN M/M/1 QUEUE Douligeris and Mazumdar [52] , and Zhang and Douligeris [205] introduced an M/M/1 queuing game G36 := (I, (Λ i ), (u36 i )), where each user i transmits packets to a single server at departure rate µ and adjusts the arrival rate λ i to maximize the "power" [113] , which is defined as the throughput λ i divided by the delay µ − i λ i , i.e.,
where α i (> 0) is a factor that controls the trade-off between throughput and delay. Note that this game is a Cournot game (see (5)) when α i = 1 for every i.
Gai et al. [62] proved that G36 is an OPG. Here, we provide a different proof. Because a game with payoff function u37 i (λ) = α i log(λ i ) + log (µ − i λ i ) is an EPG, by Theorem 11,
XVII. LOCATION UPDATE FOR MOBILE NODES
A. Connectivity
Marden et al. [115] pointed out that the sensor deployment problem (see [34] and references therein), where each mobile node i updates its location r i ∈ R 2 to forward data from immobile sources to immobile destinations, can be formulated as an EPG. Since the required transmission power to an adjacent node j ∈ I i is proportional to the square of the propagation distance, r i − r i , in a free-space propagation environment, minimizing the total required transmission power problem is formulated as a maximization problem with global objective
If
is used as the payoff function of node i, G38 := (I, (R 2 ), (u38 i )) is equivalent to the consensus game G8.
B. Coverage
A sensor coverage problem is formulated as a maximization problem with global objective in
or in discrete form [128] 
where Ω ⊂ R 2 is the specific region to be monitored, R : Ω → R + is an event density function or value function that indicates the probability density of an event occurring at point r ∈ Ω, ρ i : Ω × Ω → [0, 1] is the probability of sensor i to detect an event occurring at r ∈ Ω, and s i ∈ Ω is the location of sensor i. For a summary of coverage problems, we refer the interested reader to [32] , [33] .
Arslan et al. [13] discussed a game where each mobile sensor i updates its location s i ∈ Ω, treated φ40(s) as potential, and proposed assigning a WLU to each sensor, i.e., (1 − ρ j (r, s j )),
where ρ i (r, s i ) j =i (1 − ρ j (r, s j )) corresponds to the probability that sensor i detects an event occurring at r alone. Further discussion can be found in [115] . We would like to note that (1 − ρ j (r, s j )) dr.
Zhu and Martínez [215] considered mobile sensors with a directional sensing area. Each mobile sensor updates its location and direction. The reward from a target is fairly allocated to sensors covering the target.
Arsie et al. [12] considered a game where each node i attempts to maximize the expected value of the reward. Here, each node i receives the reward if node i is the first to reach point r, and the value of the reward is the time until the second node arrives, i.e., 
G41 := (I, (Ω), (u41 i )) was proved to be an EPG.
XVIII. CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT TO ENHANCE COVERAGE FOR IMMOBILE SENSORS
Ai et al. [2] formulated a time slot assignment problem for immobile sensors, which is equivalent to a channel allocation problem, as G42 := (I, (C i ), (u42 i )), where each sensor i ∈ I selects a slot c i ∈ C i := {1, . . . , K} to maximize the area covered only by sensor i, i.e., u42 i (c) :
where S i is the sensing area covered by sensor i. Game G42 was proved to be an EPG with potential φ42(c) = K k=1 i∈I c i =k
where φ(c)/K corresponds to the average coverage.
To show the close relationship between the payoff functions (63) in the slotted ALOHA game G30 and (81) in the coverage game G39, we provide different expressions. Using ρ i (r) := ½r∈S i , we get u42 i (c) = ρ i (r)
where the surface integral is taken over the whole area. Wang et al. [180] further discussed this problem.
June 29, 2015 DRAFT Song et al. [164] applied the coverage game to camera networks. Ding et al. [51] discussed a pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) camera network to track multiple targets. Another potential game-theoretic PTZ camera control scheme was proposed in [72] , motivated by natural environmental monitoring. Directional sensors were discussed in [95] . The form of payoff functions is similar to (80) .
Until now, each immobile sensor was assumed to receive a payoff when it covered a target alone. Yen et al. [197] discussed a game where each sensor receives a payoff when the number of sensors covering a target is smaller than or equal to the allowable number. Since this game falls within a class of CGs, it is also an EPG.
XIX. CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a comprehensive survey of potential game approaches to wireless networks, including channel assignment problems and transmission power assignment problems. Although there are a variety of payoff functions that have been proven to have potential, there are some representative forms, e.g., BSI games and congestion games, and we have shown the relations between representative forms and individual payoff functions. We hope the relations shown in this paper will provide insights useful in designing wireless technologies.
Other problems that have been formulated in terms of potential games are found in routing [8] , [97] , [156] , [157] , [186] , [202] , BS/AP selection [98] , [99] , [112] , [161] , [172] , cooperative transmissions [4] , [139] , secrecy rate maximization [11] , code design for radar [146] , broadcasting [35] , spectrum market [87] , network coding [116] , [147] , [148] , data cashing [94] , social networks [39] , computation offloading [38] , localization [79] , and demand-side management in smart grids [77] , [183] .
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